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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes an important class of models in which expectations
play an important role. Topics included in the analysis are tests of:
(1) rationality of forecasts in either market or survey data, (2) capital
market efficiency, (3) the short—run neutrality of monetary policy and,
(4) Granger causality in macroeconometric models. The common elements
of these tests are highlighted. In particular, cross—equation tests for
rationality or the short—run neutrality of money are shown to be equivalent
to more common regression tests in the literature. Also discussed are the














In this paper we develop a framework for analyzing andintegrating a
broad class of models in which expectationsplay an important role.
One reason for studying these models is thatthey have strong implications
for policy.1 Among the topics included in thisanalysis are tests of:
(1) rationality of forecasts in either market orsurvey data, (2) capital
market efficiency, (3) the short—run neutrality ofmonetary policy, i.e.,
that anticipated monetary policy has no effecton output or employment,
and (4) Granger (1969) causality in macroeconometric models.In this
paper, we highlight the common elements of these different tests and make
clear the relations among them. We find that thesetests can be used for
inference under quite general conditions. We also demonstrate theequivalence
of Granger causality tests and a test ofcross—equation restrictions in
a particular model which embodies the short—run neutrality ofmoney.
Finally, we examine the conditions for identification and theimplications
for whether various hypotheses are testable.
The paper is organized to begin with the simplestcase and to treat
increasingly complex cases. The simplest case, discussed in SectionII,
involves cross—equation tests of rationality whensome measure of
expectations is available. In the absence of directly observableexpec-
tations, some model of market behavior is needed to make inferences about
expectations. This case is discussed in Section III. Section IVdevelops
cross—equation tests of the short—run neutrality of money, and Section V
discusses the conditions under which coeffientsare identified and




Rationality of expectations implies that the market's subjective
probabilitydistribution of any variable is identical to the objective
probability distribution of that variable conditional on available
information. Following the literature, we restrict our attention to
linear models and focus only on the first moments of distributions.
Let denote the set of information available at the end of
period t—l, and let denote the objective expectation conditional
on Supposethat is generated by the following linear model.3
(1) =
Z11c1 + Z2,_1c2 +
where Z and Z 1arevectors of variables knownattime l,t—l 2,t—
t—l and are thus contained
is an error term which is assumed to have the property that
E(utIt1)
=0.
The distinction between Z and Z is that Z includes variables l,t—l 2,t—l 2,t—l
relevant for forecasting X but which are ignored by the econometrician
in conducting tests of rationality. Of courseZ21 could be empty. It is
clear from (1) that the objective expectation ofX, conditional °n —'is
(2) E(XIi) =Zi,_1ct1 + Z2,_1a2
Now consider a one—period—ahead forecast which is some observable
measure of an expectation of X made at time t—l. Rationality of expec——3—
tations requires that the forecast X mustequal the objective expectation
of conditional on Thus in the following equation
(3) =Z1,_ic+ Z2,_1a +v
rationality implies that =aa2 = andv iS identically zero.
However, in dealing with actual data on expectations,we allow for a




Thisdefinition still requires thata1 =cand a2 =a,yet it allows v to be
non—zero with the restriction that E(vtIt1)
Observe that (4) implies that the fOrecast error is uncorrelated
with information in This implication of rational expectations is the
basis for one test procedure in whichX —Xis regressed on past information.
The null hypothesis of rationality isrejected whenever the estimated
coefficientdiffers significantly from zero in theregression below:
(5)x—x
e where x —)eis the least squares projection of X —Xon Z1, and u
is the coefficient estimated with ordinary leastsquares (OLS).(Note
that X and e are n x 1 vectors withX and X, respectively, in row t.
Similarly, Z1 is a matrix of n rows which contains the Vector
Z1,_1
row t.) This is the most common test of rationality used to study forward
rates in the foreign exchange market.5-.4 -
Theeffect of ignoring relevant information in this test is made
clear by subtracting equation (3) from (1) to obtain' the following equation
for the forecast error.
(6) —x=Zi..1(ai
—c)+ Z2 t_i(a2 —c)+ u
Recall that rationality implies that — 0, —= 0and
E(ut —vIqi)
=0.Therefore, under the hypothesis of rationality, the
coefficient w estimated from the OLS regression of X —Xon Z11
(5) will be a consistent estimate of c c and should not be signifi-
candy different from zero. Note that under rationality, w is a consistent
estimate of —ceven if Z2, which is the set of relevant variables
excluded from the regression, is not empty. Thus leaving out relevant
variables from the OLS regression (5) will not affect the rationality
implication that w should not differ significantly from zero.
Another way of stating the point made above is that the test
described here is a test of rationality no matter what past information
is included in Z1 (or no matter what information is excluded from the
regression equation.)6 That is, plim w can differ from zero only if there
is a violation of rationality. However, it is possible that plim w
could equal zero even in the presence of irrationality. For example,
suppose that =
cL,E(u vI%1)= 0 and Z2 is orthogonal to Z1 ,yetthere
is irrationality because c. In this case, plim w =0.Therefore,
a failure to reject the null hypothesis, even asymptotically, does not
rule out irrationality.7'8
Studies that test for the rationality of survey forecasts [Pesando
(1975), Carlson (1977), Nullineaux (1978) and Friedman (1978)] use the




where X and e are the linear leastsquares projections of X and e onto
Z1, and y and y are the OLS coefficient estimates. As pointed out by
Nodigliani and Shiller (1973), rationality ofexpectations requires that
A
plimy =plimy*. This implication of rationality becomes clear if we
suppose that Z2, the set of variables excluded from the regressions in
(7) and (8), is empty; that is, the regressions in (7) and (8) contain
all information in t—l relevant for forecastingX. In this case, y
and y* are each consistent estimates of under the null hypothesis of
rationality, and they should not differ significantly from each other.9
Testing the cross—equation restriction y =y*is equivalent to testing
w =0in (5), sinceis numerically identical to y y*.
Now suppose thatZ2is not empty so that relevant variables are
excluded from (7) and (8). In thiscase, the estimates y and y generally
will not be consistent estimates of and c, respectively, even if
expectations are rational. However, rationality of expectations still
A A A A impliesthat plim y =plimy*because y —y*is numerically equal to
u, and plim w =0. The equality of plim )'andplim y* reflects the equal
asymptotic bias in the two estimates)0
This section has analyzed tests of rationality in thepresence of
some observable measure of expectations. The general conclusion is that
a rejection of y =y*or, equivalently, w =0,is a rejection of rational
expectations regardless of the completeness of the information setspecified
by Z1. The two alternative procedures discussed here are thus tests of
rationality under quite general conditions.—6—
In the absence of direct observations on expectations, we must infer
information on expectations from observed market behavior. In the next
section we discuss the use of security price data to test for the
rationality of expectations.—7—
III
TESTS OF RATIONALITY AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
Tests of rationality in capital markets focus on holding—period
returns for securities. LetRt denote the return from holding a particular
security from t—l to t.(This return includes both capital gains and
intermediate cash income.) Rationality of expectations,or equivalently,
capital market efficiency, implies that the subjective expectation of
Rt
assessed by the market is equal to the objectiveexpectation conditional
°
(9)E(Rq1) =E(Rq1)
where E(RtJ1) is the subjective expectation assessedby the market.
As in section II, a weaker condition is used in empiricalapplications:
(10) E(R —E(R1)jq1)0
In order to give (10) empirical content, we mustspecify a model of market
equilibrium which relates E (RI41)to some subset of past information:
(11)E(RtI1) =
where is contained in q1.Thereader is referred to Fama (1976)
for a discussion of various models of marketequilibrium used to determine
E(RJ1) in empirical work. Combining (10) and (11), we obtain
(12)E(yJ1) =0
where y R —
Testsof (12) are tests of the joint hypothesis that 1)expectations are
rational (market efficiency) and 2) thatthemodel of market equilibrium is
correctly specified in measuringy.—8—
Equation (12) above implies that should be uncorrelated with any
past information in Itis the basis for a common test of market
efficiency11 in whichy is regressed on past information,and the null
hypothesis that ci.0 is tested in the equation below:
(13) y =Zia+
where an 2,—element row vector of information contained in
=2.x 1 vector of coefficients,
=adisturbance where E(pi) is assumed to equal zero.
This procedure is a test of the joint hypothesis of market efficiency
and the model of market equilibrium, no matter what past information is
included in Z.
A model which satisfies (12) is
(14)y(X —X)iB+
where =ascalar disturbance with the property E(cki) =0——thus
Eisa serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with X
=thek—element row vector containing variables relevant to the
pricing of the security at time t
=thek—element row vector of one—period forecasts of X, j,
= E(XIt1),
=kx 1 vector of coefficients.—9—
For expositional convenience, we refer to this model (14) as "the
efficient markets model." Note, however, that it embodies not only
market efficiency (or, equivalently, rational expectations), but also
a model of market equilibrium. This model stresses that only when new
information hits the market willy differ from zero. This is equivalent
to the proposition that only unanticipated changes inX can be correlated
with
The linear model for the k variables in X can be written as
(15) =Z1y+u
where y =xk matrix of coefficients
u =k—elementrow vector of disturbances.
Suppose, for the moment, that E(ulq i =0,so that an unbiased linear
one—period—ahead forecast for the variables in X is
(16) x =z1




The systemin(15) and (17) can be stacked into one regression
system with n(k+l) observations, and estimated by non-linear least
squares.1-2The cross—equation constraints implied by market efficiency
(rationality), y =y*,can be tested with a likelihood ratio test and are
analogous to the rationality constraints for the regressions (7) and
(8). Although expectations are not directly observable, we can test—10—
their rationality by maintaining,with a model of market equilibrium, the
hypothesis that only contemporaneous unanticipated movements in are
correlated with y. Any rejection of the constraint y =y*could indicate
a failure of either the rationality of expectations about X or of the
maintained hypothesis. This issue of interpreting tests will be discussed
further in Section V.
Two questions arise as to the econometric properties of this procedure.
Does the procedure provide a test of market efficiency (rationality) under
the maintained hypothesis, even if excludes variables relevant to
forecasting the variables in Xt? Second, what is the relation of this
test to the common test for market efficiency using equation (13)? The
following theorem provides answers to these related questions.





where X is a k—element row vector, Z1 is an 2—e1ement row vector, y
is a scalar, y and y* are 2, x k parameter matrices, is a k x 1 parameter
vector. Also consider the equation
(b) y = +
I_It
where is an 2,x1 parameter vector. The quasi—likelihood ratio test of
the null hypothesis y =y*in (a) is asymptotically equivalent to a
quasi-F test of the null hypothesis ct =0in (b).(The quasi—likelihood
ratio and quasi—F tests are constructed as if the disturbances, u
and pare i.i.d. normal.)—11—
Outline of Proof:13The key insight in the proof of this theorem is to







where e =(-y—y*).The null hypothesis yy* will be true only if
o =0,and this constraint can be testedusing the nonlinear least squares
estimates of (18). The constraint that y is the same in bothequations
in (18) Is not binding, so we estimate theparameters in (18) by OLS on
each equation. Specifically, the estimatey is obtained by OLS on the
first equation, andand 0 are obtained from an OLS regression ofy
on X —Z1cand Z1. Since the residuals from the firstequation
in (18), X — areorthogonal to Z1 by construction, the estimate
of 0 will not be affected ifX Z1y is omitted from the list of
regressors when OLS is applied to the second equation in (18).14
Thus the estimate of 0 is numerically identicalto, and has the same
distribution as, the OLS estimate of c in (b). Although the test
statistic associated with the null hypothesis c. =0may differ in small
samples from the test statistic associated with the null hypotheses
o =0,these test statistics will be asymptotically equal. 15
REMARKS
Observe that 0 (y —y*)13is an jx1 vector. Thus the test of
0 =0(or, equivalently, c0) is a test of only .constraints.However,
there are 9 •kconstraints in y =y*.Therefore, all of these constraints
are testable only if k =1.Even when k >1,imposing the constraint—12--
y =y*places only R. binding restrictions on the system in (a).16This
issue is discussed in Section V.
If the contemporaneous correlation of u andis zero, the OLS
regression of y on u and Z will provide consistent estimates of both
and 0. However, if the contemporaneous correlation of u andis
unknown, thenis unidentified. Nevertheless, in this case the OLS
estimate of 0 is still consistent and the theorem continues to apply. Since
is, in general, unidentified, there is an alternative demonstration of
this theorem. The maximized value of the likelihood function is not
affected by an arbritrary choice of 3. Therefore, setequal to zero,
and observe that we now have a seemingly unrelated system (Zeilner (1962))
in which the right—hand side variables are identical in each equation.
Therefore, the estimates of y and 0 can be obtained from OLS equation—by--
equation.
Even if the time series model generating X is incorrectly
specified by leaving out relevant available information from Z1 so that
E(uIt1) 0, the procedure described above still provides a test
of rationality. This is demonstrated by noting that the
test of y =yis asymptotically equivalent to the test of c =0,
which is clearly a test of (12), regardless of what past information is
included in Z. However, if the model generating is not correctly
specified, then in general, there is an errors—in--variables problem which
leads to inconsistent estimates ofand y. Nonetheless, any asymptotic
bias in y will be identical to that in y.—13—
Iv
TESTSOF THE SHORT-RUN NEUTRALITY OF MONEY
Sargent (l976a) discusses tests of a classicalmacroeconometric model
which displays the neutralityproposition that anticipated countercyclical
policy, especially monetary policy, will haveno effect on output or unem-
ployment. Thus, in Sargent's model a constantmoney growth rule is not
dominated by any rule with feedback. Thiscontroversial policy implica—
17 tionis based on the rationality of expectations anda Lucas supply




is a scalar representing the deviation ofoutput (unemployment) from
equilibrium output (unemployment).
is a k—element vector ofaggregate demand variables, such as the
price level or the money supply.
is a scalar disturbance term with theproperty E(cI t1 0 ——
hence is serially uncorrelated.
This equation has theproperty of "neutrality," i.e., that only unan-
ticipated changes in have an effect ony. Note that the supply func-
tion (19) has the same form as the "efficientmarkets model" in (14). As
in the previous section, some model ofequilibrium behavior is required in
order to give the supply functionempirical content. The particular model
of equilibrium behavior used in theLucas supply function is thaty, the




A1q.,where is output at time t. j=1
Suppose that is generated by the linear model
Lv
(21) =Z1y + +
where Z1 is an 9.—element row vector of predetermined variables other
than lagged q.
y is an 9. x k matrix of coefficients.
is a k—element row vector of coefficients.
Note that (21) has the same form as the linear model (15)except that in
(21) we distinguish between lagged values of and other predetermined
variables. We assume for the moment that E(utI4ti) =0and combine (19),
(20) and (21) to obtain the system
L'




—. + . + Et i=1 i=1
with the cross—equation rationality constraints y=y* and ij.=iI, i=l,..
Anyrejectionof these constraints could indicate a violation of the null
hypothesis of rationality,or of the maintained hypothesis of the model of
equilibrium output and the neutrality of anticipatedpolicy.
SaTgent (l967a) has proposed usingGranger (1969) causality tests19
to test the joint hypothesis of
rationality of expectations, the model of
equilibrium output, and neutrality ofanticipated policy as embodied in—15-
(22). This joint hypothesis requires thatZ1 fails to Granger cause
Specifically, if OLS is used to estimate the parameters .anda in
(23) =E
q:1cl_1+Zia +, i=1
theestimate of a should not differ significantly from zero.
The relationship between tests of the cross—equation constraints in
(22) and the Granger causality test in (23) is made clear by thefollowing
corollary.
COROLLARY:
If L' >L,then a quasi—likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis
*
y=yin (22) is asymptotically equivalent to a quasi—F test of the null
hypothesis that a0 in (23).
OUTLINE OF PROOF:
As in the proof of the theorem, the unconstrainedsystem (22) can be
rewritten as
L'





—Et_i)3 + E + Z 18+E i1 i=1 i=i
where =(_*)and 0. = fori =1,...,L'.
Note that since 0. and A. are each coefficients of in (24), the sepa-
rate parameters 0. and A. are not identified for I <L<L'.Hence, the
constraints .=for I <Lare not testable.2° In order to test the
testable cross—equation restrictions, the system (24) can be estimated by
OLS on each equation, as explained in the proof of the theorem in Section-46—
ui.2'Since the estimated residuals from the first equation will be
orthogonal to Z1 and for i=1,...,L', the deletion of this residual
vector from the second equation will not affect the OLS estimates of the
coefficients on Z1 and Hence,as in the previous proof, the least
squares estimates of a and 00 will be numerically identical, and the test
statistics associated with the null hypotheses a=O and 80=0 will be
asymptotically equal.
REMARKS
It is important to consider the effects of incorrectly specifying the
list of variables included in Z1. Including irrelevant predetermined
variables in will not lead to inconsistent parameter estimates but in
general will reduce the power of tests. On the other hand, excluding
relevant variables from will lead to a breakdown of the assumption
that E(utJti) =0,and will lead to inconsistent
estimate:
of y. How-
ever, even in this case any rejection of the constraint y=y in (24) indi-
cates a failure of rationality, the model of equilibriumoutput, or of
neutrality since a rejection of this constraint indicates thatZ1 Gran—
ger causes As Sargent has shown, rationality of expectations combined
with the neutrality embodied in the supply function (19)implies that no vector
of predetermined variablesZ 1——even a vector which excludes relevant pre-
determined variables——can Granger cause
We have shown that the procedure above provides a test of thejoint
hypothesis of rationality, the model of equilibrium output, andneutrality
even if relevant predetermined variables are omitted fromZ1. This indi-
cates that, contrary to a statement by Lucas (1972), tests ofneutrality
can be conducted even when there is a change in the policy regime. A—17—
change in a policy regime can be incorporated in a linear model by inclu-
ding an additional set of variables, with dummy variables to indicate the
relevant regime for any given time.22 Neglecting to take account of a
change in policy regime is equivalent to omitting the additional set of
variables from Z1. Thus, even if the variables inZ1 are chosen without
taking account of the change in policy regime, a rejection of the constraint
y=y* indicates a failure of the joint hypothesis of rationality, the
model of equilibrium output, and neutrality.
McCallum (1979) and Nelson (1979) have emphasized the point raised by
Sargent (1973, 1976b) that the Granger causality tests are valid tests of
the neutrality of anticipated policy only if:(a) lagged values of
do not enter the supply function (19); or (b) the disturbance in (19) is
serially uncorrelated. That is, if either of these two conditions does not
hold, then it is possible for Z1 to Granger causey even though antici-
pated policy is neutral.
The analysis of this paper also demonstrates these points. The corol-
lary above breaks down if there are lagged surprisesin (19) and hence in
(22). Although the contemporaneous residual from the first equation in
(.24) is, by construction, orthogonal to and this is not true of
lagged residuals. Thus, the test of y=y will no longer be equivalent to
a Granger—causality test. Therefore, Granger—csa1ity will no longer be
a test of the joint hypothesis of rationality, the model of equilibrium
output and neutrality.
Now consider the case in which only contemporaneous innovations in
appear in (19) and (22), but c is serially correlated, implying that is
serially correlated. Here, the corollary holds and the Granger—causality
* testis asymptotically equivalent to the test of y =y .However,since the—18—
right—hand side of both (22) and (23) includes lagged dependent
variables, the estimates of c' and 0 will no longer be consistent. Thus
both sets of tests are invalid in this case.23—19—
V
COEFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION ANDHYPOTHESISTESTING
In this section we examine estimation and hypothesistesting in a
broader class of models in which expectations, andespecially deviations
from expectations, are important determinants of behavior.Since this
broader class of models contains the models used fortests of market
efficiency discussed earlier in this paper, as well as models based on the
work of Barro (1977), the analysis of this section willprovide
a unifying framework for two important branches of the literature.






where X is a k—element row vector of observations at time t
onvariables whose surprises are correlated with
is a h-element row vector of predetermined variables at time
t useful in predicting X,
y is a h x k matrix of coefficients,
y is a scalar,
.isa k x 1 vector of coefficients. 1
Observethat the system (25) embodies the exclusion restriction that
Z11 does not enter the second equation of (25) except as it enters the
term representing X.. This exclusion restriction is crucialto identi-
fication and hypothesis testing as discussed later in this section.—20—
Note that if X is interpreted as the growth rate ofmoney and if
is the deviation of output from some natural level, then (25)represents
the model used by Barro. Alternatively,in the efficient markets model,
is a vector of variables relevant forpricing a security at time t,
s —E(RI1)as defined in Section III, and N =0.
The system (25) embodies two sets of constraints.Rationality of
expectations is imposed since the coefficient y whichappears in the
equation for X also appears in the equation fory. The system (25)
exhibits neutrality because the coefficient on is constrained to be
zero when X —isincluded as an explanatory variable. Relaxing





where y is a h x k matrix of coefficients,
S. is a k x 1 vector of coefficients.
1
Ifall of the coefficients in (26) can be estimated (anissue to be dis-
cussed later in this section), then a comparison of theweighted sums of
squares from (25) and (26) provides a joint test of both the rationality
constraints y =y*,and the neutrality constraints &=0, conditionalon
the maintained hypothesis of the model ofequilibrium output.
As an alternative to relaxing both theneutrality and rationality
constraints, we can relax only one set of the constraints. Forexample,
maintaining the hypothesis of rationality but relaxing theassumption of







Under the maintained hypothesis thatexpectations are formed rationally,
the null hypothesis ofneutrality, i.e., .=0, can be tested bycomparing
the estimated systems (25) and(27). This test is similar to thoseconducted
by Barro.
Rather than maintain the hypothesis ofrationality of expectations
and then test for neutrality,one can maintain the hypothesis ofneutrality






A comparison of the estimatedsystems (25) and (28) provides a test of
the null hypothesis ofrationality, i.e., y=y*, under the maintained
hypothesis of neutrality. Note that whenN= 0, so that only the current
surprise in X appears in the secondequation in (28), this test is the
efficient markets test discussed inSection III. In the efficient markets
case, neutrality is a reasonable maintainedhypothesis since the absence
of neutrality would indicate thepresence of unexploited profit opportu-
nities. Maintaining the hypothesisthat unexploited profitopportunities
do not exist, the null hypothesis of
rationality can be tested. It must
be noted, however, that arejection of the null hypothesis thatY=y* may
result from a breakdown of
rationality, neutrality, or the model ofmarket
equilibrjum—22—
The statistic for the joint hypothesis of rationality and neutrality
can be partitioned into the contribution from each component hypothesis
by sequentially relaxing the constraints. The order in which these constraints
are relaxed is arbitrary from a statistical viewpoint. However, some
a priori economic reasoning may suggest an appropriate sequence for
relaxing constraints. For example, in testing whether anticipated monetary
policy affects output, it seems appropriate first to relax 3.0 and test
neutrality under the maintained hypothesis of rationality. Indeed, this
test of neutrality is essentially the Barro test. Then, without maintaining
neutrality, the constraint y=y*can be relaxed, and rationality can be
tested, as in Leiderman (1980) and Mishkin (1982).
Under the alternative sequence for relaxing constraints, we first
relax the constraint y =y*and test for rationality under the maintained
hypothesis of neutrality. Indeed, in the case in which N0, this is the
test of the efficient markets model discussed in Section III. The next step
in relaxing constraints permits a test of neutrality without maintaining
the hypothesis of rational expectations. Here the test is conductedon
the assumption that the expectations of in the second equation of the
system (26) are formed with the same set of information,Z1, as the
time.-series model of.Xt in the first equation. Yet if we are not willing
to assume that expectations are rational, there seems to be no reason to
assume that the same set of variables belongs in Z in both equations in (26).
Therefore, it is not clear that this test yields useful information.
IDENTIFICATION
The various tests discussed above depend on estimation of thepara.-
meters i5,andy* in the unconstrained system (26). More specifically,—23—
neutrality requires that the estimate of S. not differ significantly from
zero, and rationality requires that the estimate of y* not differ signifi-
cantly from y. These restrictions are testable only if the relevantpara-
meters are identified. If not all of the parameters are identified, then
only some of the restrictions, or linear combinations of restrictions,are
testable.
We outline here a procedure for determining identificationby analyzing
the following interesting special case of systems (25) —(28)where we




= *) +(1zt_j_jui*j +
where is a k—element row vector of variables relevant for
determining k￿l.
is a (p+k)—element row vector of variables dated t—i which
are used in predicting X. It contains the k elements of
as well as p other variables; p ￿ 0.
is a scalar.
and y are (p+k) x k matrices of parameters,
and .arek x 1 column vectors of parameters.
Note that (29) embodies the following simplifying assumptions:(a) the
same lag length applies to all variables used to predictX in the first
equation,and (b) in the second equation, the same lag length, N, is used
for both anticipated and unanticipatedX. These assumptions, which are—24—
made for expositional clarity, can be relaxed and thefollowing discussion
can be generalized in a straightforward manner. Note also that therow
vector which is used in the time—series model for predicting
contains the k—element row vectorX., since lagged values of the dependent
variable are often useful in prediction. In addition, therow vector
contains p other variables at time t—i, wherep 0. We also assume that
u and are uncorrelated and that E(u Jci =E(Ec1)
=0.Finally,
recall that the rationality restriction isy.= y, i1, .., M,and the
neutrality restriction is ó. =0,j 0, .., N.
The first step in determining identification is toanalyze the order
condition. For example, consider the most unconstrainedsystem (29) in
which y, y, and S. are the free parameters to be estimated. Observe
that y can be estimated by OLS on the firstequation in (29). The
remaining parameters .,and6. must be estimated from the second equation
in (29). The most unconstrained form of this secondequation is
N M+N
(30) =_••+ z +
t
A M A whereu.X .— . t—J t—ji=lt—j—i1
isa (p+k) x 1 column vector of parameters which is zero25
if 6.0, j =0, ..., Nand y =y.I =1,..., N.
Note that for j =1,..., N,the residual
-'_
canbe expressed as
a linear combination of the other right—hand side variablesZ1, ..., ZtMN
That is, only the residual at timet, ,isnot perfectly correlated with
the other right—hand—side variables.Hence, the most unconstrained form
of this equation which can be estimatedby OLS is—25--
M+N
(31) y =u + + S tto ,=1t t
Since there are k elements in and (M+N) (p+k) elements in the 0'
coefficients, equation (31) can be used to estimate at most k + (N+N)(p+k)
parameters. As long as this number of estimable parameters exceeds the
number of free parameters contained in the 3, 6, andy* coefficients, the
order condition is satisfied.
Identification depends on the rank condition as well as the order
condition. The rank condition is particularly important in the identification
of (29) because, in general, it need not be satisfied when the order condition
is satisfied. This failure to satisfy the rank condition becomes clear if
we rewrite (29) as
M 1 1 1
(32) =' +
1=1
M k k k
xt =. zt_iyi+
1=1
k N N M
= {(x. 3) + '(6—) zt—.*S}
s1 j0 j=O i=l
s th where X ,y,y. ,andu are the scolumns of X ,y.,y' and u respectively. t 1 1 t t 11 t
s s th The scalars .and6. are the selements of .and6. respectively.
Note that for any particular s, say s, the system will beunchanged
by a doubling of all of the elements of y for all i and a halving of
S S 1
o




0arenot identified even when the order
S
conditionis satisfied. A restriction on any element of or y. is
sufficient to identify these parameters. Applying this argument to each
of the k values of s, it is clear that k restrictions are needed to identify
all of the parameters in (29). The restrictions will be provided if
either neutrality (.0)or rationality (y. =y)is treated as a
maintained hypothesis. Thus, only if neither neutrality nor rationality
is maintained will the rank condition fail to be satisfied in situations
when the order condition is satisfied.
Tests of hypotheses are conducted by comparing the residual sums
of squares from constrained and unconstrained systems. The number of
restrictions tested (and hence the number of degrees of freedom in the
statistic) equals the number of identified parameters estimated in
the unconstrained system less the number of identifiedparameters estimated
in the constrained system. To illustrate this calculation using the
procedures above, consider the test of rationality, under the maintained
hypothesis of neutrality, in the efficient markets case in which N 0.
The last equation in the constrained system (where =0,y.y) contains
k parameters (the elements of 3), all of which are identified. The last
equation in the unconstrained system (where S =0)contains k +Mk(p+ k)
parameters. However, as explained above, only k + M(p+k) parameters can be
estimated. Only if k=l will all of the parameters in the unconstrained
system be identified. However, even if k>l, there are M(p+k) testable
restrictions. These restrictions are linear combinations of the restrictions
y — 0.(See footnote 16 for an example.)—27—
An alternative test which may be conducted in the efficientmarkets
framework (N=O), is a test of the null hypothesis ofneutrality under
the maintained hypothesis of rationality. Recall that the lastequation
of the constrained system = = 0)contains k parameters (the
elements of ),andobserve that the last equation of the unconstrained
system (y.y) contains 2k parameters (the elements ofand In
both the constrained and unconstrainedsystems, all of the parameters are
identified and all k neutrality restrictions are testable.
A third test in the efficient markets framework isa test of the
joint hypothesis of neutrality and rationality. As in the two tests discussed
before, all k parameters of the last equation in the constrainedsystem are
identified. In the unconstrained systemthelast equation contains
2k + Mk(p+k) parameters(k elements of ,kelements of and Mk(p+k) elements
of y, i =1, ... , M),but, as explained above, only k +M(p +k) parameters
can be estimated. Therefore, under no circumstances will all of the
parameters of this equation be identified. However, there are M(p+k)
testable restrictions which are linear combinations of therestrictions
y —= 0and 0.
The interpretation of the tests above depends on whathypothesis is
maintained. In particular, the test statistic associated with thejoint
test of rationality and neutrality is identical to the test statisticfor
the test of rationality, under the maintainedhypothesis of neutrality. This
follows from the fact that, although the freeparameters in the unconstrained
systems are different, the estimated coefficients are identical.Furthermore,
the constrained systems are the same. Because of theequivalence of the two
tests, one can not determine whether a rejection is due to a violation of
rationality alone or a violation of both rationality andneutrality.—28—
Another interesting example arises in tests of policy neutrality under
the maintained hypothesis of rationality as in Barro (1977, 1978). In these
models it is assumed that the deviation of current output from its natural
level is affected only by the current and N lagged surprises in a single
policy variable (i.e., k=l and N >0).In order to obtain identification
of the coefficients on surprises in the policy variable, these studies
implicitly place restrictions on the covariances of with both u1 and
with lagged disturbances. There are two alternative conditions which are
sufficient for identification of the c5 coefficients, i.e., the coefficients
on anticipated policy. One condition, discussed and used by Barro (1977,11978,
1.979), Leiderman (1980), and Mishkin (11982), is the exclusion restriction p>1.
That is, the time series model for the policy variableX contains at least
one variable which is not directly included in the output equation. The
output equation in the constrained system (where c5. =0and y. =y)
contains N+l parameters (, • and in the unconstrained system
(where y. =y)it contains 2(N+l) parameters and
SN). In each of these systems, all of the parameters are identified
because the number of free parameters is less than the number of estimable
parameters,l + (M+N)(p+l). Therefore all of the N+l neutrality restrictions
are testable.
The alternative sufficient condition for identification is M>N;
that is, the number of lags in the time series model for the policy variable
exceeds the number of lagged surprises in the output equation. Although this
condition does formally lead to identification, it requires strong a priori
knowledge of lag lengths. Without this prior knowledge we are faced with
the observational equivalence problem raised by Sargent (l976b).—29—
For identification of S. it isnecessary that at least one of the
two conditions above holds. One recent piece of research wherethis does
not occur is in Grossman (1979). His specification of the time—series
equation describing his policy variable (nominal GNP growth) does not include
any variable other than lagged dependent variables. In addition, the
number of lags in the output equation exceeds that in thetime—series
equation for the policy variable. Therefore, the CS coefficients in his
model are not identified, with the result that not all theneutrality
constraints can be tested.—30--
VI
SUNMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The testing framework in this paper facilitatesanalysis and inte-
gration of a wide range of issues in testing rationality, capital market
efficiency, and the short—run neutrality of monetary policy. The main
points of this analysis are summarized below.
1. Given observations on expectations of a variable, there are two
alternative procedures for testing rationality of these expectations.
One procedure tests for correlation between the forecast error and past
information. The other procedure tests the cross—equation restriction
that the relation of the forecast to past information is the same as the
relation of the realization to past information. These two procedures
are equivalent. Furthermore, these procedures provide tests of rational-
ity regardless of what past information is used.
2. In the absence of direct observations on expectations, we can test
rationality (market efficiency) by testing cross—equation restrictions
similar to those used in rationality tests involving direct observations
on expectations. The cross—equation test of the joint hypothesis of mar-
ket efficiency and the model of market equilibrium is asymptotically
equivalent to the common test in which the deviation of the return from
the equilibrium return is regressed on past information. Since thecom-
mon test procedure is a test of market efficiency and the model of mar-
ket equilibrium even if some relevant past information isignored, the
cross—equation procedure also has this property.
3. Granger causality tests for the short—run neutrality ofmonetary—31—
policy are asymptotically equivalent to tests of cross—equation restric-
tions in a model in which only contemporaneous surprises inmonetary policy
affect unemployment or output. Since these Grangercausality tests are
tests of the joint hypothesis of rationality, neutrality, and the model of
equilibrium output, even if relevant past information is ignored, the
cross—equation procedure is also a test of this joint hypothesis. Thus,
even if the policy regime changes, and the change is ignored, we still are
able to test the joint hypothesis.
4. If lagged surprises in monetary policy affectoutput and unemployment,
then the Granger causality test and the cross—equation testare no longer
asymptotically equivalent. If the disturbance term in the output equation
is serially correlated, then the two procedures are asymptoticallyequiva-
lent; however, they are no longer tests of short—run neutrality.
5. There is a straightforward procedure for determining whether coeff i—
dents are identified and whether hypotheses are testable. A particular
application of this procedure shows why all of the neutrality restrictions
are testable in Barro's (1977, 1978) model, but not in J. GrossmanTs
(1979) model.—32—
FOOTNOTES
1.For example, see Sargent and Wallace (1975), Lucas (1976), Poole
(1976) and Mishkin (1978).
2.Many of the results in this section are not new. Yet the exposition
here sets the stage for the later sections which do contain new
results.
3.In this paper we use the convention that the subscript t indicates
that a variable is realized at the end of period t. For a variable
which describes a security's one—period return, the subscript t
indicates that the return occurs between the end of period t—1 and
the end of period t.
4.If v is identically zero, then X is a minimum variance unbiased
forecast of X. Replacing the restriction thatv be identically zero
with the restriction that E(vtJ4 l =0will remove the minimum
variance property of X ,butnot the unbiasedness conditional on
5. See the survey in Levich (1979).
6.Recall that the information in Z1 musthave been available to
the market at time t—1 since we are assuming thatZ1,_1 is contained
7. In addition, the power of the test for w =0could be low because
the reported standard errors of w, which is an estimate ofct, —
couldbe overstated.
8. In this case, the probability of Type II error does not go to zero
as the sample size goes to infinity.
9. One way to test for the significance of—isto stack (7)
and (8) into one regression and perform a Chow test for the equality of—33--
coefficients. (See Pesando (1975)). However, if, as islikely, the
variance of residuals in (7) differs from the variance of residuals
in (8), a correction must be made for thisheteroscedasticity. See
Mullineaux (1978).
10. In this case, plim y =
a1+ (z Z1) ZZ2a2 and plim
=a+ (z1 Z1) Z Zc Since = anda2 =aunder
rationality, the asymptotic bias is identical for y and y*.
11. See Fama (1976).
12. Systems of this type have been estimated in Mishkin(198la,b).
13. Abel and Mishkin (1980) contain a more detailedproof and discussion
of identification. This paper also shows that ifappropriate corrections
for degrees of freedom are made, tests using (a) versus (b)are not
only asymptotically equivalent, but are equivalent in finite samplesas
well.
14. Observe that the second equation in (18)contains a model of market
equilibrium and can be rewritten as
(*) Rt +(X —x)+z1e +
The proof outlined above treats as known. If it were unknown
and were assumed to be a linear function ofpast variables W1, then
W1 must also be included as explanatory variables in the time series
model for X. This will preserve theorthogonality of the residuals
in the equations for with the other right hand side variables in
equation (*),therebyallowing the proof of the theorem to proceed as
in the text. This issue is discussed further in theproof of the
corollary in section IV. Of course, if the coefficients of in—34—
the model of market equilibrium areestimated, then we cannot test
the rationality restriction thaty is uncorrelated with W1. The
question of testability of such restrictions is discussed in sectionV.
15. Even if the disturbances are notnormal, the quasi—likelihood ratio
test can be used for valid inference underquite general conditions.
See Kohn (1979).
16. Consider the case in which=k=2.The system of equations can be
written as:
xlt =Yllzl,_l+ 121z2,t_l +
ult
X2 Yi2Zi,_1 + —l+
llt + 2t - +Yi2)zi,_1 —211+ 12 2)Z21 +
The four parametersy.. can be estimated from the first twoequations.
If Cov(c ,u)isknown to be zero, we can estimate
(y11 + and + y) from the third equation. Since
we cannot separately estimate the four elementsy*, we cannot separately
test the four restrictionsy.. =y.*..However, we can test 22 linear 13 13
combinations of the rationality restrictions:
(y11 — +12 — 0for 1=1 and 2. If we do not know
the covariances of E andu ,thent3and are not identified. t it 1 2
However, we can still test whether the two linearcombinations above are
equal to zero. To see this, rewrite the thirdequation as
=[(i11—y)81 + Z1,_1 + 2l2l +
+ + u2 ÷
£t
Observe that the coefficients of Z and Z in the rewritten
l,t-.l 2,t—l—35—
equation are the testable linear combinations of rationality restrictions.
17. See Modigliani (1977).
18. The model of equilibrium output provides the exclusion restriction
that Z1 does not enter the second equation of (22) except as it is
contained in e. This restriction leads to identification in the system.
See section V.
19. The use of the word 'causality" in describing the Cranger (1969) test
is somewhat unfortunate, for it has led to much confusion in the
literature. It is really a test of predictive content and not of
economic causation. See Zeilner (1979) for a discussion of this point.
20. As indicated in footnote 14 and Section V, since we must estimate the
coefficients of q1(i =1,...,L) in the model of equilibrium output,
we do not obtain testable restrictions on the estimates of iJ. and
for i =1,...,L. The constraints O=O, and hence = canbe
obtained only if we impose the identifying restriction that the lag
length L in (20) is shorter than the lag length L' in (21). This
appears to be a rather strong assumption to impose on the basis of
a priori knowledge, and one should be cautious in interpreting
results based on estimates of 0. in this case.
1
21.Of course, OLS cannot be directly applied to the second equation of (24)
as it is written, since the variables appear twice on the
right—hand side. This equation must he rewritten to eliminate the
perfect colinearity of right—hand variables; then OLS may be used.
22. If there are two policy regimesin the sample period 1 to T, then
we can write—36—
X =Z1y1 + u1 for t=1to T1
= +u1 for t=
T1+ 1 to T
which can be rewritten as:







23. If (19) is quasi—differenced to obtain a specification with a serially
uncorrelated disturbance, the new specification will contain current
and lagged residuals from the first equation in (24). Hence, the
Granger causality test will not be a true test of the joint hypothesis
of rationality, the model of equilibrium output, and neutrality, as
explained in the paragraph above.
24. We assume thatvariablesare measured as deviations from sample means
so that no constant term appears in any equation.
25. Specifically, e= {(y.—y)f3. + yó.} ,liM,and O<j<N.
1+J=—37—
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